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Abstract
In secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) the multiplication AB from two private
matrices A and B is outsourced by a user to N distributed servers. In `-SDMM, the goal is
to a design a joint communication-computation procedure that optimally balances conflicting
communication and computation metrics without leaking any information on both A and B to
any set of ` ≤ N servers. To this end, the user applies coding with A˜i and B˜i representing encoded
versions of A and B destined to the i-th server. Now, SDMM involves multiple tradeoffs. One
such tradeoff is the tradeoff between uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) costs. To find a good balance
between these two metrics, we propose two schemes which we term USCSA and GSCSA that are
based on secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA). We show that there are various scenarios where
they outperform existing SDMM schemes from the literature with respect to UL-DL efficiency.
Next, we implement schemes from the literature, including USCSA and GSCSA, and test their
performance on Amazon EC2. Our numerical results show that USCSA and GSCSA establish
a good balance between the time spend on the communication and computation in SDMMs.
This is because they combine advantages of polynomial codes, namely low time for the upload of(
A˜i, B˜i
)N
i=1
and the computation of Oi = A˜iB˜i, with those of SCSA, being a low timing overhead
for the download of (Oi)Ni=1 and the decoding of AB.
Index Terms
Matrix Multiplication, Security, Interference Alignment, Distributed Computing.
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Fig. 1: System Model of SDMM.
I. Introduction
Distributed matrix multiplication (DMM) is an important ingredient in many applications,
including but not limited to machine learning and object recognition. Recently, coding theory
has been applied to enhance the efficiency of DMM. Prominent outcomes of this research
thrust are Entangled Polynomial codes [1] and PolyDot codes [2]. Although DMM can
resolve computational and memory related difficulties, there are security concerns about
providing information to external servers. Secure DMM (SDMM) seeks to handle these
security concerns through cryptographic, coding and/or information-theoretic means. In the
cryptography literature, DMM is applied amongst others in cloud computing [3], [4] and in
the MapReduce framework using partially homomorphic encryption [5]. In this work, we are
interested in SDMM from a coding and information-theoretic perspective.
The main problem of SDMM is to effectively retrieve the matrix product AB from N
distributed servers without leaking any information on finite field left matrix A ∈ Fm×n and
right matrix B ∈ Fn×p to any set of ` ≤ N external servers (cf. Fig 1). To this end, a user
who seeks to determine AB, encodes matrices A and B individually to encoding matrices{
A˜i
}N
n=1 and
{
B˜i
}N
i=1. The user then provides the i-th server with both A˜i and B˜i from which
the i-th server computes Oi = A˜iB˜i. After the download of any Q ≤ N server observations
O j , j ∈ Q ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, |Q| = Q, the user shall be able to decode AB. In this context, Q
is known as the recovery threshold (RT). We may measure the efficiency of SDMM through
various conflicting metrics.
Two metrics related to the communication efficiency may be the upload (KUL) and down-
load (KDL) communication costs1. They measure the ratio of total number of bits uploaded
1We use the words upload and uplink interchangeably. The same applies to download and downlink.
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(or downloaded) vs. the number of bits attributed to uploading (A,B) to N servers (or
downloading AB from any Q servers). Other metrics are rather concerned with the compu-
tation complexity. Specifically, the computation complexity can be attributed to both the
user and the server. The user computation complexity is comprised of encoding and decoding
complexity while the server computation complexity refers to the matrix multiplication
Oi = A˜iB˜i. In case of high deviation in server computation times, minimizing the RT
Q may be important to be robust against particularly slowly computing servers which are
frequently termed as stragglers.
TABLE I: Related work in the research area of SDMM.
Metric
Downlink
cost
Recovery
threshold
Tradeoff
Downlink costs vs.
recovery threshold
Uplink vs.
downlink costs
[6]–[10] [7], [9] [11] [12], [13]
The most related work on SDMM based on different performance metrics is given in Table
I. Initially, the research focused on minimizing the download costs for cases where either
only one matrix (e.g. A) is private [6]2 or both matrices A,B ought to be secured [7]–[10],
[14]. For the first scenario, the capacity is fully characterized while for the latter scenario
only the asymptotic capacity where the ratio of matrix dimensions satisfy n/min(m,p) → ∞
is known. The (asymptotic) capacity-achieving scheme uses a novel interference alignment
scheme known as secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) [15]. In this alignment scheme,
undesired components are distributed over multiple subspace dimensions. More recently,
rather than optimizing over a single metric, attempts on characterizing the tradeoff between
(a) KDL and RT [11] or (b) KDL and KUL [12], [13] have been pursued. In [12], [13], a
modified system model of SDMM is considered where elements of SDMM are intertwined
with private information retrieval (PIR). Specifically, a user is interested in retrieving ABθ ,
θ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, privately without revealing any information on A and the realization of θ
to the servers.
2This setting is known as one-sided SDMM.
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In this work, similarly to [12], [13], we analyze the tradeoff between KDL and KUL for
the classical SDMM system model. To this end, we propose two SCSA-based, uplink cost
adjustable schemes which we term USCSA and GSCSA. These two schemes allow us to
flexibly balance uplink and downlink costs through respective matrix partitioning and en-
coding parameters. By choosing USCSA and GSCSA scheme parameters appropriately, we
can benefit from advantages of both polynomial and SCSA codes. Note that these schemes
resemble an SCSA-scheme developed for the problem of coded distributed batch matrix
multiplication, which was proposed very recently in an independent work by Jia et al. [16].
Furthermore, to verify our theoretical findings, we test USCSAs and GSCSAs performance
against various other schemes with respect to the time needed for upload, computation,
download and decoding through implementation on Amazon EC2 clusters. Our proposed
schemes show a particular good balance between the time needed for upload and download.
Notation: Throughout this paper, boldface lower-case and capital letters represent vec-
tors and matrices, respectively. Specifically, for any integer a, we define an to be column
vector of dimension n× 1 with all elements being a. A = diag(xn) is a diagonal n× n matrix
with the i-th diagonal entry Aii corresponding to the i-th element xni of xn. We use ⊗ to
denote the Kronecker product. Further, for any two integers a, b with a ≤ b, we define
[a : b] , {a, a + 1, . . . , b}.
II. System Model
We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM). In this
problem, the user has two confidential matrices A ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×p with elements
drawn from a sufficiently large field F. The goal of the user is to retrieve the matrix product
AB by using N servers without revealing the identity of both A and B to the curious
servers. We assume that any set L ⊆ [1 : N] of |L| = ` ≤ N collude. The system model of
SDMM is shown in Fig. 1.
To ensure secure matrix multiplication, the user applies encoding functions f = ( f1, . . . ,
fN ) and g = (g1, . . . , gN ) to encode matrices A and B, respectively. Hereby, fi and gi denote
functions that encode matrices A and B for the i-th server. A˜i and B˜i are the encoded
versions of A and B provided to the i-th server; in other words, they are the outputs of
encoding functions fi and gi, i.e.,
A˜i = fi(A), B˜i = gi(B).
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We assume that every server is honest, thus the server observation Oi is a deterministic
function of A˜i and B˜i, i.e., H(Oi |A˜i, B˜i) = 0. Upon receiving all server observations O[1:N] =
(O1, . . . ,ON ), the user is able to determine AB by invoking the decoding function d(·),
such that AB = d(O[1:N]). Information-theoretically, this is equivalent to the decodability
constraint
H
(
AB |O[1:N]
)
= 0. (1)
Since servers j ∈ L collude and the security has to be preserved, the collection of encoding
matrices A˜ j and B˜ j, ∀ j ∈ L, denoted by A˜L and B˜L, do not reveal any information on
private matrices A and B. Thus,
I
(
A˜L, B˜L;A,B
)
= 0, ∀L ⊆ [1 : N], |L| = `. (2)
In this paper, we compare the communication cost of SDMM schemes. This cost is comprised
of uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) costs. These two costs are defined as follows
KUL =
∑N
i=1 |A˜i | + |B˜i |
n(m + p) , (3)
KDL =
∑N
i=1 |Oi |
mp
, (4)
where |A˜i |, |B˜i |, |Oi | denote the number of elements in A˜i, B˜i and Oi, respectively. In (3)
and (4), the denominator corresponds to the number of matrix elements of (A,B) and AB,
respectively. In the next sections, we elaborate on both converse and achievability results
on these two metrics. As far as the achievability is concerned, we review the cross subspace
alignment scheme [15] applied to SDMM [9], [10] and then elaborate on our uplink cost
adjustable SDMM schemes.
III. Review: SCSA in SDMM
Before discussing our scheme that balances uplink and downlink cost, we review SCSA.
This scheme is parametrized by the variable b ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, we write SCSA(b). In the
following, we describe the main ingredients of SCSA(b), namely matrix partitioning, encoding
at the user, matrix multiplication at the servers and the decoding at the user.
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A. Matrix Partitioning
Most schemes execute horizontal and vertical matrix partitioning of both A and B. To
this end, we define the partitioning operator PART ([vA, hA], [vB, hB])3, which breaks matrix
A into vAhA equal-size sub-matrices Ai j ∈ Fm/vA× n/hA, ∀i ∈ [1 : vA], j ∈ [1 : hA] and matrix
B into vBhB sub-matrices B j k ∈ Fn/vB× p/hB, ∀ j ∈ [1 : vB], k ∈ [1 : hB] such that
A =

A11 A12 . . . A1hA
A21 A22 . . . A2hA
...
...
...
...
AvA1 AvA2 . . . AvAhA

, B =

B11 B12 . . . B1hB
B21 B22 . . . B2hA
...
...
...
...
BvB1 BvB2 . . . BvBhB

.
Note that the PART-operator works under the assumption that m, n and p are multiple of
vA, hA and hB, respectively. In SCSA(b), b ∈ {0, 1}, the user either applies only a partitioning
• of matrix A in the form PART([r, 1], [1, 1]) if b = 0,
• or of matrix B in the form PART([1, 1], [1, r]) if b = 1
with r = N − 2`. In the sequel of this chapter, we describe latter case (b = 1). For this case
AB =
[
AB1 AB2 . . . ABr
]
.
B. Encoding at the User
Based on the above partition, the user encodes matrixA and each sub-matrixB j (destined
to the i-th server) for SCSA(1) individually according to:
A˜
( j)
i =
∆i
( j + αn)
(
A +
∑`
k=1
( j + αi)kZ j k
)
, (5)
B˜
( j)
i = B j +
∑`
k=1
( j + αi)kZ′j k, (6)
where ∆i =
∏r
u=1(u + αi) and Z j k , Z
′
j k represent i.i.d., uniformly distributed noise terms to
ensure privacy of A and B. The scalars αi, ∀i ∈ [1 : N], are distinct elements of
G = {αi ∈ F | j + αi , 0, ∀ j ∈ [1 : r]} . (7)
The user then sends the pairs
(A˜(1)i , B˜(1)i ), . . . , (A˜(r)i , B˜(r)i )
to the i-th server.
3Note that hA = vB .
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C. Matrix Multiplication at the Servers
Upon receiving all pairs
{
A˜
( j)
i , B˜
( j)
i
}r
j=1
, the i-th server computes
Oi =
r∑
j=1
A˜
( j)
i B˜
( j)
i
=
[
∆i
(1+αi) . . .
∆i
(r+αi) ∆i ∆iαi . . . ∆iα
2`−1
i
]
⊗ Im

AB1
...
ABr∑r
j=1 I j,0∑r
j=1 I j,1
...∑r
j=1 I j,2`−1

, (8)
where I j k denotes the effective interference terms. The i-th server output Oi ∈ Fn× pr is then
transferred to the user.
D. Decoding at the User
The user receives the server responses O1, . . . ,ON . In SCSA, all undesired terms (e.g.,
AZ′j k) disperse to multiple powers ∆iα
k
i in the range k ∈ [0 : 2` − 1] (The superposition of
these terms gives I j k). Simultaneously, all desired terms AB j are distinguishable from each
other and from the interference by their unique powers ∆i( j+αi) . In other words, the user is
able to decode the desired items since it can construct a full rank decoding matrix
DSCSA =

∆1
(1+α1) . . .
∆1
(r+α1) ∆1 ∆1α1 . . . ∆1α
2`−1
1
∆2
(1+α2) . . .
∆2
(r+α2) ∆2 ∆2α2 . . . ∆2α
2`−1
2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
∆N
1+αN . . .
∆N
(r+αN ) ∆N ∆NαN . . . ∆Nα
2`−1
N

from server observations O1, . . . ,ON each of dimension n × p/r with r = N − 2`. Thus,
KSCSADL =
N
r
=
N
N − 2` .
Since we can reverse the partitioning in SCSA, we can show that
KSCSA(b)UL =

KSCSA(0)UL =
N
(
m
p +r
)
1+mp
for PART ([r, 1], [1, 1])
KSCSA(1)UL =
N
(
1+mp r
)
1+mp
for PART ([1, 1], [1, r])
.
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Thus, the lowest possible uplink costs is the minimum of these two cases. Thus,
KSCSAUL = minb∈{0,1}K
SCSA(b)
UL =
N min
(
1 + mp r,
m
p + r
)
1 + mp
.
Note that the pairs
(
KSCSA(0)UL ,K
SCSA
DL
)
and
(
KSCSA(1)UL ,K
SCSA
DL
)
are both achievable in the
UL-DL tradeoff curve.
IV. Uplink Cost Adjustable Schemes
In SCSA(b), we can apply two partitioning/encoding scenarios – b = 0 and b = 1. Recall
that SCSA(1) uses PART ([1, 1], [1, r]), i.e., the matrix A is left without partitioning while
matrix B is horizontally partitioned into r sub-matrices. The user conveys to the i-th server
r encoded pairs
{
A˜
( j)
i , B˜
( j)
i
}
, j ∈ [1 : r]. The transmission of multiple pairs with a low
partitioning level to single servers results in an excessive use of uplink resources. To make
better use of uplink resources, we propose two uplink cost adjustable SCSA schemes –
uplink-adjustable SCSA (USCSA) and group-based, uplink-adjustable SCSA (GSCSA) –
which guarantee better uplink performance than SCSA in exchange for an increase in the
downlink costs. As opposed to the classical SCSA of section III, both schemes use a more
general partitioning and a modified encoding strategy. We discuss the details in the next
sub-sections.
A. Matrix Partitioning
Table II specifies the options of partitioning strategies applied by the user for the different
schemes. We use the flag variable b ∈ {0, 1} to differentiate between PART ([d, 1], [1, c])
(b = 0) and PART ([c, 1], [1, d]) (b = 1). In GSCSA( f , q, v, 0), we assign sub-matrices A j ,
j ∈ [1 : f q] into v¯ groups comprised of v sub-matrices per group. Group k, ∀k ∈ [1 : v¯],
includes sub-matricesA[(k−1)v+1:kv] ,
{
A(k−1)v+1, . . . ,Akv
}
. In the sequel, we use the indexing
set Ik,v , {(k−1)v+1, . . . , kv} to refer to the j-th partitioning group comprised of v elements.
Throughout the text of this section, we use g ∈ { f , q}, g¯ = { f , q} \ g, u = max ( f , q),
u¯ = min ( f , q), v ∈ {u¯, u} and v¯ = {u¯, u} \ v.
B. Encoding at the User
Now, we describe the encoding of both USCSA( f , q, g, 0) and GSCSA( f , q, v, 0). Under the
described partitioning, the encoded matrices destined to the i-th server are
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TABLE II: Applied matrix partitioning strategies based on the proposed schemes. For all three schemes only one
partitioning scenario is described in detail in the text of Section IV.
Scheme Sub-Scheme Partitioning Comments
SCSA
SCSA(0) PART ([r, 1], [1, 1])
r = N − 2`
SCSA(1) PART ([1, 1], [1, r])
USCSA( f , q, g) USCSA( f , q, g, 0) PART ([g, 1] , [1, g¯]) g ∈ { f , q}, g¯ = { f , q} \ g
USCSA( f , q, g, 1) PART ([g¯, 1] , [1, g])
GSCSA( f , q, v) GSCSA( f , q, v, 0) PART ([ f q, 1], [1, 1]) u = max ( f , q), u¯ = min ( f , q) ,
GSCSA( f , q, v, 1) PART ([1, 1], [1, f q]) v ∈ {u¯, u}, v¯ = {u¯, u} \ v
• in case of USCSA( f , q, g, 0) for j ∈ [1 : g¯]
A˜
( j)
i =∆i
(
g∑
k=1
1
k + ( j − 1)g + αiAk +
∑`
p=1
( j + αi)p−1Z jp
)
, (9)
B˜
( j)
i =B j +
g∏
k=1
(
k + ( j − 1)g + αi
) ( ∑`
p=1
( j + αi)p−1Z′jp
)
, (10)
• and in case of GSCSA( f , q, v, 0) for j ∈ [1 : v¯]
A˜
( j)
i =∆i
©­«
∑
k∈Ij,v
1
k + αi
Ak +
∑`
p=1
( j + αi)p−1Z jpª®¬ , (11)
B˜
( j)
i =B +
∏
k∈Ij,v
(k + αi)
∑`
p=1
( j + αi)p−1Z ′jp, (12)
where ∆i =
∏ f q
s=1(s + αi) and Z jp, Z′jp represent i.i.d. noise terms to ensure privacy. The
user sends pairs
{
A˜
( j)
i , B˜
( j)
i
}g¯
j=1
in case of USCSA( f , q, g, 0) and
{
A˜
( j)
i , B˜
( j)
i
} v¯
j=1
in case of
GSCSA( f , q, v, 0) to the i-th server.
Remark 1. The encoding strategy of matrices A and B for both USCSA and GSCSA are
exchangeable. In other words, we can use the encoding strategy in (9) and (11) for matrix
B and the encoding in (10) and (12) for matrix A. This establishes USCSA( f , q, g, 1) and
GSCSA( f , q, v, 1). However, for the sake of brevity, we describe the remaining steps of the
scheme for Eqs. (9)-(12).
Privacy Constraint: Now consider the privacy constraint for any ` colluding servers, given
by {i1, . . . , i`}, αL = [αi1, . . . , αi` ]Tand ∆L = [∆i1, . . . ,∆i` ]T for both USCSA( f , q, g, 0) and
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GSCSA( f , q, v, 0). Further, we define Z , {Z j1, . . . ,Z j`}ej=1 and Z′ , {Z′j1, . . . ,Z′j`}ej=14,
where e = g¯ for USCSA and e = v¯ for GSCSA.
• For USCSA( f , q, g, 0), A˜L ,
{
A˜
( j)
i1
, . . . , A˜
( j)
i`
}g¯
j=1
and B˜L ,
{
B˜
( j)
i1
, . . . , B˜
( j)
i`
}g¯
j=1
can be
represented by
A˜L = Ig¯ ⊗ diag (∆`) ·
©­­­­­­­­­­­­­«
blkCAUCHY (αL, g, g¯) ⊗ Im
g
·

A1
A2
...
Ag
︸︷︷︸
=A
+diagVAND (αL, g¯) ⊗ Im
g
· Z
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
,
(13)
B˜L = Ig¯ ⊗ 1` ⊗ In ·

B1
B2
...
Bg¯
︸︷︷︸
,B ′
+Γ(g¯) · diagVAND (αL, g¯) ⊗ In · Z′, (14)
where
blkCAUCHY (αL, g, g¯) =

CAUCHY (αL,−[1 : g])
CAUCHY (αL,−[g + 1 : 2g])
...
CAUCHY (αL,−[(g¯ − 1)g + 1 : g¯g])

,
diagVAND (αL, g¯) =

VAND` (1 +αL) 0` . . . 0`
0` VAND` (2 +αL) . . . 0`
... ... . . . ...
0` 0` . . . VAND` (g¯ +αL)

,
4Note that these matrices differ in their dimension for USCSA and GSCSA. While for USCSA( f , q, g, 0) [Z] =
`g¯mg × n, [Z ′] = `g¯n × pg¯ , for GSCSA the dimensions are [Z] = `v¯ mv¯ f × n, [Z ′] = `v¯n × p.
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Γ(g¯) =

∏g
j=1 diag (j +αL) 0` . . . 0`
0`
∏g
j=1 diag (j + g +αL) . . . 0`
... ... . . . ...
0` 0` . . .
∏g
j=1 diag (j + (g¯ − 1)g +αL)

,
with the Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices being
CAUCHY(a, b) =

1
a1−b1
1
a1−b2
1
a1−b3 . . .
1
a1−bn
1
a2−b1
1
a2−b2
1
a2−b3 . . .
1
a2−bn
...
...
...
. . .
...
1
am−b1
1
am−b2
1
am−b3 . . .
1
am−bn

∈ Fm×n
VANDn(a) =

1 a1 a21 . . . an−11
1 a2 a22 . . . an−12
...
... . . .
. . .
...
1 am a2m . . . an−1m

∈ Fm×n
for a = [a1, a2, . . . , am]T and b = [b1, b2, . . . , bn]T .
• Similarly, for GSCSA we can write the observations A˜L ,
{
A˜
( j)
i1
, . . . , A˜
( j)
i`
} v¯
j=1
and B˜L ,{
B˜
( j)
i1
, . . . , B˜
( j)
i`
} v¯
j=1
as follows
A˜L = Iv¯ ⊗ diag (∆`) ·
©­­­­­­­­­­­­­«
diagCAUCHY (αL, v, v¯) ⊗ I m
f q
·

A1
A2
...
A f q
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
+diagVAND (αL, v¯) ⊗ I m
f q
· Z
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
,
(15)
B˜L = 1v¯` ⊗B + Γ(v¯) · diagVAND (αL, v¯) ⊗ In · Z′, (16)
where
diagCAUCHY (αL, v, v¯) =
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
CAUCHY (αL,−[1 : v]) 0` . . . 0`
0` CAUCHY (αL,−[v + 1 : 2v]) . . . 0`
... ... . . . ...
0` 0` . . . CAUCHY (αL,−[(v¯ − 1)v + 1 : v¯v])

.
From (13)-(16), it is possible to rewrite A˜L and B˜L compactly by
A˜L = P · (Q ⊗ I ·A +R ⊗ I · Z) , (17)
B˜L = S (B) + T ⊗ I · Z′, (18)
where
S (B) =

Iq ⊗ 1` ⊗ In ·B′ for USCSA
1q` ⊗B for GSCSA
.
Since the inverses for P and R ⊗ I in (17) and T ⊗ I in (18) exist, we can show that the
observations of any ` colluding servers are independent of A and B.
I
(
A,B; A˜L, B˜L
)
= I
(
A,B; (R ⊗ I)−1P −1A˜L, (T ⊗ I)−1 B˜L
)
(17),(18)
= I
(
A,B; (R ⊗ I)−1Q ⊗ I ·A +Z, (T ⊗ I)−1 S(B) +Z′
)
≤ I(A,B;Z,Z′) = 0
Since I
(
A,B; A˜L, B˜L
)
≥ 0 in general, we infer that
I
(
A,B; A˜L, B˜L
)
= 0.
C. Matrix Multiplication at the Servers
Every server i multiplies its pairs and accumulates them to retrieve the server output Oi.
Mathematically, the server output becomes
• for USCSA( f , q, g, 0)
Oi =
g¯∑
j=1
A˜
( j)
i B˜
( j)
i =
g¯∑
j=1
C ji
• and for GSCSA( f , q, v, 0)
Oi =
v¯∑
j=1
A˜
( j)
i B˜
( j)
i =
v¯∑
j=1
C ji,
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where e.g. for USCSA( f , q, g, 0)
C ji =
g∑
k=1
∆i
k + ( j − 1)g + αiAkB j +
∑`
p=1
g∑
k=1
∆i
©­­«
g∏
k ′=1
k ′,k
(k′ + ( j − 1)g + αi)
ª®®¬︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
,h[g]\k, j (αi)
( j + αi)p−1AkZ′jp
+
∑`
p=1
∆i( j + αn)p−1Z jpB j +
(
g∏
k=1
(k + ( j − 1)g + αi)
)
︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
,h[g], j (αi)
∑`
p=1
∑`
p′=1
∆i( j + αi)p+p′−2Z jp′Z′jp
(a)
=
g∑
k=1
∆i
k + ( j − 1)g + αiAkB j +
∑`
p=1
g∑
k=1
p−1∑
t=0
∆ih[g]\k, j(αi)
(
p − 1
t
)
jp−1−tαtiAkZ
′
jp
+
∑`
p=1
p−1∑
t=0
∆i
(
p − 1
t
)
jp−1−tαtiZ jpB j +
∑`
p=1
∑`
p′=1
p+p′−2∑
t=0
∆ih[g], j(αi)
(
p + p′ − 2
t
)
jp+p
′−2−tαtiZ jp′Z
′
jp
(b)
=
g∑
k=1
∆i
k + ( j − 1)g + αiAkB j +
2(`−1)+g∑
t=0
∆iα
t
iI jt .
Note that in step (a), we use the binomial expansion in the form ( j + αi)p = ∑pt=0 (pt )αti jp−t .
In step (b), we combine all undesired terms AkZ′jp, Z jpB j and Z jp′Z′jp with matching
exponents in αi to effective interference components I jt , ∀t ∈ [0 : 2 (` − 1) + g]. Hereby,
we exploit in step (b) that h[g], j(αi) is a degree g non-zero polynomial in αi. A similar
expression on C ji can be derived for GSCSA but is omitted here for the sake of brevity.
Overall, summing C ji over j ∈ [g¯] or j ∈ [v¯], we obtain
• for USCSA( f , q, g, 0)
Oi =
g¯∑
j=1
g∑
k=1
∆i
k + ( j − 1)g + αiAkB j +
g¯∑
j=1
2(`−1)+g∑
k=0
∆iα
k
i I j k
• and for USCSA( f , q, v, 0)
Oi =
v¯∑
j=1
v∑
k=1
∆i
k + ( j − 1)v + αiA( j−1)v+kB+
v¯∑
j=1
2(`−1)+v∑
k=0
∆iα
k
i I j k .
D. Decoding at the User
Similarly to SCSA, we can derive a decoding matrix for both USCSA and GSCSA by
finding a linear representation of O[1:N] as a function of desired sub-matrix products AkB j
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and interfering terms I′k =
∑
j I j k . The general full-rank decoding matrix for both USCSA
and GSCSA is given by
D =

∆1
(1+α1) . . .
∆1
( f q+α1) ∆1 ∆1α1 . . . ∆1α
2(`−1)+d
1
∆2
(1+α2) . . .
∆2
( f q+α2) ∆2 ∆2α2 . . . ∆2α
2(`−1)+d
2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
∆N
1+αN . . .
∆N
( f q+αN ) ∆N ∆NαN . . . ∆Nα
2(`−1)+d
N

for d ∈ { f , q}. This matrix has the dimension N ×Q with
QUSCSA( f ,q,g,b) = f q + g + 2` − 1
QGSCSA( f ,q,v,b) = f q + v + 2` − 1,
for b ∈ {0, 1}, g ∈ { f , q} and v ∈ {u, u¯}5. Since there are at most N server observations
accessible, the user selects f , q, g and v such that Q ≤ N. Overall the user recovers f q
desired items from Q overall items (including 2` + d − 1, d ∈ { f , q}, interference terms I′k).
Thus, we attain the download costs
KUSCSA( f ,q,g)DL =
f q + g + 2` − 1
f q
, (19)
KGSCSA( f ,q,v)DL =
f q + v + 2` − 1
f q
. (20)
For these downlink costs we need the following respective uplink costs.
KUSCSA( f ,q,g)UL = minb∈{0,1}K
USCSA( f ,q,g,b)
UL = min
©­­«
N
(
1 + mp
g¯
g
)
1 + mp
,
N
(
g¯
g +
m
p
)
1 + mp
ª®®¬ , (21)
KGSCSA( f ,q,v)UL = minb∈{0,1}K
GSCSA( f ,q,v,b)
UL = min
©­­«
N
f
(
v¯ f + mp
v¯
q
)
1 + mp
,
N
f
(
v¯
q +
m
p v¯ f
)
1 + mp
ª®®¬ . (22)
Ultimately, we can flexibly balance the matrix partitioning (and ultimately the uplink costs)
against the downlink costs. For the special case, when g = 1 and g¯ = f q = N − 2`, USCSAs
downlink and uplink costs reduce to the one of SCSA.
5Since Q is independent of b ∈ {0, 1}, in the sequel, we remove the index b wherever possible.
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V. Comparison of SDMM Schemes
In the following, we first construct a lower bound on KUL.
Lemma 1. For independent and uniformly distributed matrices A and B, the uplink cost
KUL is bounded from below by
KUL ≥ NN − ` . (23)
Proof. Details of the proof are provided in the Appendix. 
A. USCSA vs. GSCSA
The uplink costs for both USCSA and GSCSA are
• increasing in m/p for m/p ∈ (0, 1] and
• decreasing in m/p for m/p ∈ [1,∞).
Thus, defining
KUL , infm/p KUL
KUL , sup
m/p
KUL,
we get for USCSA
KUSCSA( f ,q,g)UL = N min
(
1, g¯
g
)
,
K
USCSA( f ,q,g)
UL =
N
(
1 + g¯g
)
2 ,
and for GSCSA
KGSCSA( f ,q,v)UL = N
v¯
f q
,
K
GSCSA( f ,q,v)
UL =
N v¯
(
1 + 1f q
)
2 .
Recall that KUSCSA( f ,q,v)DL = K
GSCSA( f ,q,v)
DL while K
USCSA( f ,q,v)
UL , K
GSCSA( f ,q,v)
UL in general for
v , 1 or v¯ , 1. If v, v¯ > 1, we infer from (21) and (22) that for
• m/p ∈ (0, 1/max( f ,q)] ∪ (max ( f , q) ,∞): KGSCSA( f ,q,v)UL ≤ K
USCSA( f ,q,v)
UL and
• m/p ∈ (1/max( f ,q),max ( f , q)]: KGSCSA( f ,q,v)UL ≥ K
USCSA( f ,q,v)
UL .
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In other words, for low and high ratios of m/p, GSCSA( f , q, v) outperforms USCSA( f , q, v).
Further, we may upper bound the additive gap
0 ≤ 1
K?UL
− 1
KUL
≤ N − `
N
− 1
KUL
= 1 − `
N
−

2
N
(
1+ g¯g
) for USCSA( f , q, g)
2
N(v¯+ 1v ) for GSCSA( f , q, v)
≤ 1 − `
N
−

2
N
(
1+max( f ,q)min( f ,q)
) for USCSA( f , q, g)
2
N
(
max( f ,q)+ 1min( f ,q)
) for GSCSA( f , q, v)
(a)≤ 1 − `
N
− 2
N (N − 2` + 1) = 1 −
`
N
− 2
N2
· 1
1 − (2`−1)N
, (24)
where (a) follows from maximizing the denominator of the last term for QUSCSA,QGSCSA ≤
N. This suggests that the maximum additive gap 1K?UL −
1
KUL
is decreasing in /`N.
B. Uplink-Downlink-Cost-Tradeoff – Comparison with Other Schemes
We now compare the achievable reciprocal uplink and downlink cost pairs (1/KUL, 1/KDL) for
various SDMM schemes. These are the aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S) [7] and the gap
additive secure polynomial (GASP) scheme [8]. Fig. 2 shows the performance of all schemes
when N = 100, ` = 8, g = v = f and m/p = 200.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1/KUL
1 /K
D
L
A3S & GASP
USCSA (g = f )
GSCSA (v = f )
Upper Bound
Fig. 2: Comparison between the achievable reciprocal uplink and downlink cost pairs for multiple schemes: (i) A3S
& GASP Codes, (ii) USCSA and (iii) GSCSA. In these plots, we set N = 100, ` = 8 and m/p = 200. For the upper
bounds, we use 1/KDL ≤ (N−`)/N = 0.92 and 1/KUL ≤ (N−`)/N = 0.92.
Recall that in this case, both 1/KUL and 1/KDL are bounded from above by (N−`)/N = 0.92
(cf. dotted line in Fig. 2). On the one hand, the lowest downlink cost of KDL = 1/0.84 is
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attained for SCSA (or USCSA and GSCSA when f = 1 and q = N − 2` = 84) when
1/KSCSAUL ≤ 1/141.3 ≈ 0.007. On the other hand, the lowest uplink cost is when 1KUL ≈ 0.35 for
which KDL ≤ 4299 ≈ 0.42. For USCSA and GSCSA, this cost pair is achievable for f = 42 and
q = 1. For this example, we see that for almost all pairs, GSCSA outperforms all remaining
schemes.
VI. Python Implementation
Five schemes (SCSA, USCSA, GSCSA, A3S and GASP) have been implemented using the
python library MPI4py that provides the Message Passing Interface (MPI). The implemen-
tation is available on GitHub [17]. In order to create a cluster we have used StarCluster, an
open source tool for cluster computing [18]. We created a cluster on Amazon EC2, consisting
of N+1 hosts – one user and N servers, which run on the instances c3.8xlarge. To compare
the schemes, we measure the time for (a) the upload of encoding matrices
(
A˜i, B˜i
)N
i=1
(TUL),
(b) the server computation (TC), (c) the download of (Oi)i∈Q (TDL) and (d) the decoding of
AB (TDC). As far as the computation at the servers is concerned, we do not measure the
whole time that is spent by all servers to compute Oi but rather the average time TC over
the number servers. However, because all servers exhibit very similar timing overhead for
the computation, the fluctuation around the mean value is very small and can therefore be
neglected. The total time, which was spent on the SDMM process is computed as the sum
U
se
r
Se
rv
er
Server 1
Server 2
Server 3
Server N
...
Server 1
Server 2
Server 3
Server N
Server 1
Server 2
Server 3
Server N
... ...
User
 
  
 
⎯ ⎯⎯⎯
 
 
  
 
  
Time
Wait
Wait
Wait
Wait
Fig. 3: Time measurement setup in our implementation. In the figure, we assume that the recovery threshold
matches the number of servers N.
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(cf. Fig. 3)
Tˆ = TUL + TC + TDL + TDC. (25)
A. Numerical Results
We test our implementation for two scenarios. In each scenario, we gradually increase the
matrix dimensions of A and B – namely m, n and p – according to the sequence
c j = 1.3c j−1, ∀c ∈ {m, n, p} , ∀ j ∈ [1 : 9]
and measure the times TUL, T¯C, TDL, TDC and Tˆ for (mk, nk, pk), ∀k ∈ [0 : 9]. We average each
time measurement over 10 iterations and plot the time measurements over a single matrix
dimension – namely p. Next, we specify the two considered scenarios.
Scenario 1: In this scenario, we choose ` = 4, N = 15, m0 = 90, p0 = 1000 and n0 ∈
{10, 100}. We call Scenario 1 with n0 = 10 (n0 = 100) the small-n (big-n) scenario. All schemes
apply a PART ([rA, 1], [1, rB]) matrix partitioning scheme. The schemes are parametrized as
follows:
• A3S:
(
rA3SA , r
A3S
B
)
= (1, 4),
• GASP:
(
rGASPA , r
GASP
B
)
= (2, 2),
• SCSA:
(
rSCSAA , r
SCSA
B
)
= (1, 7),
• USCSA:
(
rUSCSAA , r
USCSA
B
)
= (2, 3),
• GSCSA:
(
rGSCSAA , r
GSCSA
B
)
= (1, 6)
and f = 2 and q = 3 for USCSA and GSCSA. The results for this scenario are shown in
Fig. 4 (n0 = 10) and in Fig. 6 (n0 = 100).
Scenario 2: In this scenario, we set ` = 2, and N = 18 and keep m0, p0 and n0 as in
Scenario 1. Since ` and N changed (as compared to Scenario 1), we adapt the schemes
according to:
• A3S:
(
rA3SA , r
A3S
B
)
= (2, 4),
• GASP:
(
rGASPA , r
GASP
B
)
= (3, 3),
• SCSA:
(
rSCSAA , r
SCSA
B
)
= (1, 14),
• USCSA:
(
rUSCSAA , r
USCSA
B
)
= (3, 4),
• GSCSA:
(
rGSCSAA , r
GSCSA
B
)
= (1, 12)
and f = 3 and q = 4 for USCSA and GSCSA. We plot the results for this scenario in Fig.
5 for n0 = 10 and in Fig. 7 for n0 = 100.
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Now we discuss the numerical results. We discuss each time measurement individually in
the following paragraphs.
1) Upload: This time is devoted to send the encoded matrices A˜i and B˜i to servers
i ∈ [1 : N]. It is easy to see that for a sufficiently large p, A3S outperforms all remaining
schemes in all scenarios. Further, we see that in comparison to SCSA both GSCSA and
USCSA reduce the upload time significantly, e.g., for p ≈ 0.8 · 104 the SCSA upload time
is about 84% (47%) higher than of GSCSAs (USCSAs) upload time for Scenario 2 with
n0 = 100. The dominance of USCSA and, in particular, GSCSA over SCSA is exacerbated
with increasing matrix dimension n (cf. upload time of Figs. 5 and 7). Overall, the order in
incurred upload time of all five schemes is in agreement with their order of upload costs.
2) Computation: This time accounts for the computation of A˜i and B˜i at each server i.
We do not use any advanced matrix multiplication algorithms, e.g., [19], [20]. In schemes
that use polynomial codes (PC), such as A3S and GASP, each server i simply multiplies
A˜i ∈ F
m
rA
×n with B˜i ∈ Fn×
p
rA . In contrast to PC schemes, in cross subspace alignment
(CSA) schemes such as SCSA, USCSA and GSCSA, each server i multiplies A˜( j)i ∈ F
m
rA
×n
with its respective pair B˜( j)i ∈ F
n× prA and accumulates all J6 matrix products according to∑J
j=1 A˜
( j)
i B˜
( j)
i . For the scenarios under study, this results in the highest computation time
for SCSA and the slowest for A3S and GASP. As expected, as we increase n0 from 10 to 100,
only the absolute time for the computation increases without affecting the relative order of
the schemes.
3) Download: The download time in our experiment spans the duration until the user
receives all N server observations O1,O2, . . . ,ON ∈ F
m
rA
× prB 7. Since KSCSADL ≤ K
G(U)SCSA
DL ≤
KGASPDL ≤ KA3SDL for a constant ` and N, we expect that for sufficiently large matrix dimen-
sions SCSA will outperform all remaining schemes with respect to the download time. Our
numerical results confirm this expectation. Further, the numerical results also verify that
for all schemes the download time does not depend on the matrix dimension n (cf. download
time of Figs. 4 and 6).
4) Decoding: The decoding time encompasses the time at the user (i) to construct the
N ×N decoding matrix D, (ii) to determine the inverse D−1 and (iii) to multiply the inverse
6In our experiments, we set J to J = N − 2` for SCSA and J = q for GSCSA and USCSA.
7In our experiments, the recovery threshold Q matches the number of servers N.
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Fig. 4: Scenario 1 – small-n (n0 = 10).
D−1 with the set of N server observations O[1:N]. For the inversion we use python built-in
functions instead of fast algorithms for the inversion of Vandermonde matrices [21]–[23] in
case of polynomial codes or Cauchy-Vandermonde matrices [24] for CSA codes. Thus overall,
the time for steps (i) and (ii) are (a) independent of the matrix dimensions m, n and p and
(b) behave similarly for all five schemes. On the contrary, the time for step (iii) scales with
1
rArB
and mp and thus vary for different schemes. Again, the numerical results validate this
behavior for large matrix dimensions. For instance, SCSA has the largest rArB-value and
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Fig. 5: Scenario 2 – small-n (n0 = 10).
simultaneously has the lowest decoding time.
5) Total Time: We compute the total time according to Eq. (25) and plot the results in
Figs. 4–7. While n0 = 100 is a preferable situation for A3S and GASP (see Figs. 6 and 7) over
SCSA, SCSA tends to outperform GASP and A3S in situations where n0 = 10. GSCSA and
USCSA, on the other hand, possess good performance results over both scenarios irrespective
of the n0 value. This is mainly due to the fact that they combine advantages of GASP and
A3S (i.e., upload and computation) with those of SCSA (i.e., download and decoding).
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Fig. 6: Scenario 1 – big-n (n0 = 100).
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem (SDMM),
where a user is interested in computing the matrix product AB of two private matrices
A and B. To this end, the user outsources the multiplication job to N distributed servers
without leaking any information to any set of ` ≤ N colluding servers. In SDMM, the goal is
to find schemes that optimally balance conflicting communication and computation metrics.
One such tradeoff is the one between uplink and downlink communication efficiency. As part
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Fig. 7: Scenario 2 – big-n (n0 = 100).
of this study, we first propose two uplink adjustable secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA)
schemes, namely USCSA and GSCSA that balance uplink and downlink communication
costs. Next, we implement various SDMM schemes of the literature (including USCSA and
GSCSA) in Python and compare computation and communication times using Amazon
EC2 instances. Our numerical results show that USCSA and GSCSA establish a good
balance between the time spend on the communication and computation in SDMMs. A
future research thrust is to refine our schemes by using optimized algorithms for encoding,
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matrix multiplication and matrix inversion [19], [24], [25].
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Secure computing of AB requires that
(i) H(A,B |A˜[1:N], B˜[1:N]) = 0 (cf. decodability constraint (1)) and
(ii) H(A,B) = H(A,B |A˜L, B˜L) for any L ⊆ [N], |L| = ` (cf. security constraint (2)).
Thus, we infer that
H(A,B) = I(A˜LC, B˜LC ;A,B |A˜L, B˜L)
= H(A˜LC, B˜LC |A˜L, B˜L) − H(A˜LC, B˜LC |A˜L, B˜L,A,B),
where LC = [1 : N] \ L. Ignoring the second term of above mutual information term gives
the upper bound
H(A,B) ≤ H(A˜LC, B˜LC |A˜L, B˜L). (26)
Since there are
( N
N−`
)
possible subsets LC of non-colluding servers of size N − `, we can sum
up (26) and obtain (
N
N − `
)
H(A,B) ≤
∑
LC⊆[1:N]
|LC |=N−`
H(A˜LC, B˜LC |A˜L, B˜L)
⇐⇒ H(A,B) ≤ N − `( N
N−`
) ∑
LC⊆[1:N]
|LC |=N−`
H(A˜LC, B˜LC |A˜L, B˜L)
N − `
Now, we can apply Han’s concentration inequality [26] on conditional entropies to get
H(A,B) ≤ (N − `)
N
H(A˜[1:N], B˜[1:N])
≤ (N − `)
N
N∑
n=1
H(A˜n, B˜n)
≤ (N − `)
N
(
N∑
n=1
H(A˜n) + H(B˜n)
)
≤ (N − `)
N
(
N∑
n=1
|A˜n | + |B˜n |
)
log F.
For independent and uniformly distributed matrices A and B, H(A,B) = n(m + p) log F.
For this case, rearranging above inequality gives the bound (23).
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